Error-correcting output codes (ECOC) is an ensemble method combining a set of binary classifiers for multi-class learning problems. However, in traditional ECOC framework, the binary classifiers are trained independently. To explore the interaction between the binary classifiers, we construct an error correction network (ECN) that jointly trains all binary classifiers while maximizing the ensemble diversity to improve its robustness against adversarial attacks. An ECN is built based on a code matrix which is generated by maximizing the error tolerance, i.e., the minimum Hamming distance between any two rows, as well as the ensemble diversity, i.e., the variation of information between any two columns.
1) adversarial training, which augments the training data with adversarial examples [5] , [6] , 2) modifying neural network/training procedure, e.g., defensive distillation [7] , and 3) post-training defences, which attempt to remove the adversarial noise from the input examples [8] [9] [10] in the testing phase.
Out method belongs to type 2 defence. While most of the defences of this type focus on robustifying a single network, there some works have considered using ensemble models [11] [12] [13] . The ensemble members solve the same classification problem, thus it is essential to promote the diversity among the ensemble members to prevent adversarial examples from transferring between them, i.e., the adversarial examples crafted for one member may also fool the other members thus making the ensemble model ineffective defending adversarial examples. ECOC [14] , [15] is a special ensemble model that combines a set of binary classifiers according to a given code matrix. In its applications to sensor networks [16] , [17] and crowdsourcing systems [18] , [19] where sensors or crowd workers act as unreliable binary classifiers, ECOC has shown its fault-tolerant capacity in such harsh scenarios. Our proposed ECN is inspired by the significant fault-tolerant ability of ECOC.
The ECN is constructed based on a binary code matrix where each row of the code matrix is a N-bit codeword representing one class label. Given a codeword length N and number of classes L, a code matrix is generated in an iterative manner with the objective of maximizing the minimum distance between any two rows and that between any two columns. Let ECN N denote an ECN with each class label being encoded into N bits. A simple example can be found in Table I . Each column of a code matrix groups the original L classes into two macro- classes with macro-class 0 containing classes indicated by bit 0 and macro-class 1 containing classes indicated by bit 1, and thus ECN consists of N binary classifiers aiming for different tasks. The central idea is ECN creates sufficient redundancy in the codewords such that it may tolerate some wrong predictions, i.e., flipped bits, made by individual networks. ECN promotes the diversity between models by design as its members are working for different binary classification tasks. Thus, adversarial examples crafted for one individual network has less impact [20] on the other members as compared to the existing ensemble model whose members are working on the same task. To explore the interaction between ensemble members, we promote the orthogonality between the weight matrices learned at the last layer of the members. After all individual networks make their binary predictions, we concatenate them into a N-bit predicted codeword and use a decoder (a trainable dense layer) to make the final prediction. In sum, we obfuscate deliberately in each binary classifier the training labels by partitioning them into two macro-classes, and in the final layer of ECN, the original L labels are decoded via a trainable dense layer, thereby ECN can be trained in end-to-end fashion.
Our main contributions are summarized below 1) We apply the idea of error correction codes in building a neural network to improve model's adversarial robustness and show how this neural network can be trained in end-to-end fashion.
2) We extensively study (by experiments) the impact of code matrix on the adversarial robustness of ECN and relate row distance to error tolerance and column distance to ensemble diversity and suggest to optimize both distances for better robustness.
3) We show combining ECN with adversarial training further improves model robustness.
4)
We extend binary ECN to q-ary ECN where its branches are q-ary classifiers with q ≥ 2
and study its robustness against the binary case.
5)
We show how to adapt ECN to sparse code matrix.
In experiments, we test ECN on two widely used dataset MNIST [21] and CIFAR-10 [22] under several well-known adversarial attacks. The results show that ECN significantly improves the robustness against adversarial examples. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we brief the well-known adversarial attacks. In Section III, we introduce the structure and the training strategy of our ECN. In Section IV, we present extensive experiments results.
Section V concludes the paper.
II. ATTACK METHODS
For a normal image-label pair (x, y) and a trained DNN f θ with θ being trained model parameter, adversarial attacks attempt to find an adversarial example x ′ that remains in the L pball of radius ǫ centered at the normal example x, i.e.,
In what follows, we brief some popular adversarial attacks which will be used to verify our proposed ECN.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [6] perturbs a normal image x in its L ∞ neighbourhood to get x ′
where L(f θ (x), y) is the cross-entropy loss of classifying x as label y, and ǫ denotes perturbation magnitude, and update direction at each pixel is determined by the sign of the gradient evaluated at this pixel. FGSM is a simple yet fast and powerful attack.
Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [23] iteratively refines the FGSM by taking multiple smaller steps α in the direction of gradient-sign. The refinement at iteration i takes the form below
where x ′ 0 = x and clip ǫ,x (x ′ ) performs per-pixel clipping of the image x ′ . For example, if pixel takes value between 0 and 255, clip ǫ,
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [24] has the same generation process as BIM except PGD starts the gradient descent from a point x ′ 0 chosen uniformly at random in the L ∞ -ball of radius ǫ centered at x. 1 2 (tanh(ω) + 1). For a normal example (x, y), C&W finds the perturbation by solving the following optimization problem
. Large confidence parameter κ encourages misclassification.
III. ERROR-CORRECTING NEURAL NETWORK
In this section, we detail the structure of ECN and its training strategy. The way of generating code matrix is also briefed.
A. Error Correcting Code
Hamming distance is an important measure in error detection. It determines the maximum number of bits that is allowed to flip in one codeword without confusing it with the other codeword. Adding more bits to the codewords can increase the Hamming distance. A good error detecting code is to be able to maximize the minimum Hamming distance between any two codewords. Let r i be the i-th codeword of code matrix M, and H(r i , r j ) be the Hamming distance between the i-th and j-th codewords of code matrix M, i.e., the number of bits positions where they differ. The minimum Hamming distance of code matrix M is then given by d H (M) = min i =j H(r i , r j ). In principle, in channel communications, if we decode the received message to the class whose codeword has the minimum Hamming distance to the received message, a code matrix M can always decode correctly a message with up to d H (M)/2 erroneous bits. For example, a code matrix with minimum Hamming distance 2 can correct one erroneous bit.
B. Error Correcting Network
ECN combines an encoder and a decoder as shown in Fig. 1 , where the encoder consists of N parallel neural networks, i.e., binary classifiers, and the decoder, acting as a fusion center, is built based on the generated code matrix M. There are N binary classifiers, each of which is a convolutional neural network (CNN), taking the same images as their inputs. The n-th CNN outputs two probabilities {P 0,n , P 1,n }, n = 1, . . . , N (at the softmax layer) corresponding to macro-class 0 and macro-class 1. In addition, we extract the features from the second-to-last layer of each CNN and scale them via a batch norm layer.
These features, {F 1 , . . . , F N }, will be used to measure the diversity between the individual
CNNs.
Decoder: ECN makes predictions through a decoder which returns a label whose codeword (defined by code matrix) matches the predicted codeword (encoder's output) the best. Here, we consider two decoder options.
1) Decoder 1: Fig. 2a shows its architecture. We extract the prediction probabilities corresponding to class "1", i.e., P 1,n , n = 1, . . . , N, and stack them into a vector p 1 = [P 1,1 , . . . , P 1,N ].
Scaling the values of p 1 from [0, 1] to [−1, 1] results inp 1 = 2p 1 − 1. Then, we mixp 1 with the transpose of the code matrix,M ⊺ , whereM = 2M − 1. If the prediction accuracy is high for each binary classifier, the entries inp 1 will take values either close to 1 or close to -1, and thus the larger entries inp 1M ⊺ indicate better matching betweenp 1 and the columns ofM.
2) Decoder 2: Fig. 2b shows its architecture. As discussed in decoder 1, it is not optimal to
To accommodate the continuous inputs (to the dense layer), we use a trainable dense layer Φ. As all binary classifiers are defined by the code matrix M, simultaneously maximizing the classification accuracy of each binary classifier (the inputs to Φ) and that of the L-class classifier (the output of Φ)
will force Φ to reconstructM. Fig. 3 gives such an example. We generate a code matrix M with L = 10, N = 20 , and Fig. 3b shows Φ obtained after training on MNIST data using decoder 2 where Φ E contains the even rows of Φ, and Fig. 3c shows sign(Φ) is same as M except for few entries that are flipped. Diversity promoting between models: We impose orthogonality between the weight matrices, 
where | · | returns the sum of absolute values of all matrix entries. 
where 1 y is a L-dimensional one-hot encoding of y and 1 y (n) is a 2-dimensional one-hot encoding of y (n) which is a binary label obtained by partitioning the L-ary label y into two macro-classes according the n-th column of M, i.e., [M] n , p(x) contains the L-class probabilities obtained by passing x through the entire ECN and p (n) (x) contains the 2-class probabilities obtained by passing x through the n-th binary classifier, and α, β ≥ 0.
Code matrix design: As we have mentioned in Section III-A, a code matrix with larger d H (M) is preferred since it can correct more errors, resulting a better classification performance. However, if we only consider maximizing d H (M) when designing code matrix, the two columns of the matrix may lead the corresponding two binary classifiers to perform the same classification task even they have different bits. For a concrete illustration, consider again the code matrix example in Table I . The last two columns in Table I are different, while Net 3 and Net 4 are essentially performing the same task: classifying the classes to set {1} or {3, 4}. A adversarial example targeting at fooling Net 3 is expected to has the transferability to fool Net 4 simultaneously, weakening the robustness of ECN. To further promote the diversity between the individual classification networks, we therefore include the column diversity when designing the code matrix. Specifically, we view each column of the code matrix as partitioning the L-classes into clusters, and measure the difference between two columns using Variation of Information (VI) metric [27] . VI is a criterion for comparing the difference between two q-ary partitions, measuring the amount of information lost and gained in changing from one clustering to another clustering [27] . ECN shown above focuses on the binary individual classifier with each column of the code matrix being a binary cluster. A natural extension is the general q-ary code matrix with each ensemble member performing a q-ary classification problem. We denote the m-th column of code matrix M as c m , the classes belongs to macro-class k in the n-th column as c k n , where m = 1, . . . , N and k = 0, . . . , q − 1. The VI distance defined in [27] between c m and c n is: The code matrix is designed to
which is however a NP-complete prolem [28] . We adopt simulated annealing [29] , [30] to solve this optimization problem heuristically, where the energy function is set as:
instead of (5). This is a common technique used in simulated annealing [30] and is because bit changes not involving the minimum distance pairs would not be reflected in the energy function if it is set as (5) . The performances of the generalized q-ary ECN are compared in Section IV-G.
As each of the encoder neural network is assigned with different binary classification task.
We believe this technique can force each each ensemble member to learn different features, thus reducing the transferability of the adversarial examples among binary classification networks.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We evaluate the adversarial robustness of ECN under the attack methods introduced in Section II with different attack parameters.
A. Setup
We test on two standard datasets: MNIST [2] and CIFAR10 [31] . Table IV gives the parameters for different attack methods.
We compare our ECN with another ensemble method proposed in [13] , namely adaptive diversity promoting (ADP) ensemble method, for which we use the same architecture and model parameters as reported in [13] , i.e., ADP 2,0.5 with three ResNet20 being its ensemble members.
Note that the optimal solution of ADP is attained when L − 1 is divisible by the number of ensemble members N. For L = 10, using N = 3 is optimal for ADP and increasing N beyond that will not improve its performance.
The classification results on MNIST are shown in Table V . We can see the ECN significantly improves the adversarial robustness as compared to the baseline and ADP 2,0.5 , especially for the parameters that lead to stronger attack. ECN also maintains state-of-the-art accuracy on normal images. From the last two columns, we can see forcing orthogonality between individual networks' weight matrices is effective in improving the robustness. Table VI presents results for CIFAR10. ECN is tested using two different binary classifiers. A and net B) , ECN is consistently more robust than the competitors while the classification accuracy on normal images is slightly lower as compared with ADP 2,0.5 .
For both options (net
We believe it is possible to further improve ECN's testing accuracy via a better binary classifier model but it is beyond this paper's scope. When we were constructing a neural network for binary classifiers, we found that batch normalization (BN) causes adversarial vulnerability which can be observed in "w/ BN" and "w/o BN" columns. The model with BN becomes more vulnerable especially under gradient-based attacks, e.g. FGSM, BIM and PGD. This is consistent with what was recently reported in [33] and one possible explanation could be that BN can cause gradient exploding [34] .
C. Adversarial Training Based on ECN
ECN is complementary to the other defenses. Here we combine ECN with adversarial training (AdvT), which is the most widely studied defense. Our ECN-based AdvT follows the procedure stated in Algorithm 1. The results in Table VII are 
E. Number of Ensemble Members in ECN
For the 10-label classification problem, representing labels with unique codewords requires N ≥ 4. 
F. Row and/or Column Distance in Code Matrix
As indicated in (6), we generate a code matrix by jointly maximizing the Hamming distance between rows and the VI distance between columns. It will be interesting to see the impact of these two distance metrics on ECN. We consider three sets of code matrix:
1) random matrix whose entries are drawn randomly with probability 0. For each set, we independently generate 20 matrices. The code matrices in set 2 are designed to promote error tolerance while the code matrices in set 3 are designed to promote both error tolerance and model diversity. The statistic results are summarized in Table VIII . These three sets of code matrices make no difference in classifying the normal images. This is mainly because the trainable decoder in ECN will adapt itself to any code matrix so as to minimize the classification loss. Also, each binary neural network performs the binary classificaiton problem with high accuracy. When classifying adversarial images, using random matrices in set 1 is noticeably worse than using those in set 2 and set 3 which means increasing error tolerance indeed improves the ECN's robustness. On average using code matrices in set 3 gives the best adversarial testing accuracy. The improvement over set 2 seems not significant because we found the column distances in the matrices of set 2 are also reasonably large despite that only G. Generalization to q-ary ECN with q ≥ 2
As we have discussed in Section III-B, our code matrix design allows q ≥ 2. The q-ary ECN concatenates multiple q-ary classifiers in its encoder. We test q = 3, 4 and also includes q = 2 (binary) for comparison. The results in Table X indicate that increasing q reduces the adversarial robustness (except for C&W case). This is not unexpected because q-ary classifier has q! possible outputs and the adversarial space grows as q increases, i.e., more output combinations adversary can mess up with less efforts. This is another generalization of ECN. The code matrix M used to construct ECN is similar to 3-ary case as introduced in Section IV-G but we omit all examples in the training set for which M(r, c) = 0. This technique is inspired by [35] and makes it different from the q = 3 ECN discussed above. The sparse code matrix is selected from 100000 randomly generated matrix with the best metric introduced in [35] , using the same way as in their experiments.
To adapt ECN to such code matrix, we make the following modifications. The row of M that is the closest to f leads to the largest entry ofŷ. To normalizeŷ to probability distribution, we can apply softmax activation function onŷ.
We consider to use sparse code matrix as its behaviour mimics dropout layer but is more organized (unlike ignoring the neurons randomly as what dropout layer does).
From some initial experiments, we observe that with the same number of columns, ECN performs worse when using the sparse code matrix even in the no-attack case. This is because the sparse code matrix renders less information that the final decoder can adapt to. The classification accuracy is expected to improve with more columns. We leave this experiment in future work.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented an ensemble model ECN which is inspired by ECOC and can be trained in end-to-end fashion. Designing a code matrix by optimizing both the Hamming distance between rows and VI distance between columns makes ECN more robust against adversarial examples than optimizing row Hamming distance alone. Combining ECN with other adversarial defenses such as adversarial training can further improve model robustness. We found including
BNs makes ECN as well as other neural networks vulnerable to gradient-based adversarial attacks. We generalized ECN to allow its branches to be q-ary classifiers with q ≥ 2 and found that q-ary ECN is less robust than the binary one. We showed how to construct ECN using sparse code matrix and studied its performance.
